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Abstract
The triangular relationship amongst Egypt, Great Britain, and the United States serves as
a microcosm for the larger international context of the 1920s. Importantly, the relationship
reveals much about Egypt’s decolonization and national development strategies in the 1920s.
The increasing internationalism of the 1920s offered new avenues to pursue national interests.
Because of a changing a status quo, Egypt had an opportunity to reform old institutions and
choose new paths of national development. Despite the colonial baggage carried by Egypt,
national strategies near the end of the 1920s placed the country in a position to exert leverage on
the international community not possible even in the aftermath of World War I within the
international context of the British Empire.
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Introduction
Historians have not spilled much ink writing about the role of the United States in
British-Egyptian relations in the 1920s. While well documented tensions existed between the
United States and Great Britain in the 1920s over the gold standard, trade (e.g. the Rubber War),
oil (e.g. San Remo 1920), and international prestige (e.g. naval superiority and the Washington
Conference), these issues are not extended to other regions of the international arena such as
Egypt. Like the Anglo-American rivalry, histories of the British in Egypt during the 1920s are
also bilateral in nature, either justifying or criticizing British imperial policy. A few works have
included the United States in the political equation, notably for the influence of missionaries,
archaeologists, and recently the “disillusionment of the Wilsonian moment.” Erez Manela, the
latest scholar to address this topic, rightly considered the rosy coverage of the Americans and
U.S. policy in Egypt as an insufficient historical explanation.1 His work built upon the works of
others whose coverage of the United States in Egypt in the 1920s perpetuated the misconception
that the United States subordinated its policy objective for the Middle East and Africa to Great
Britain. Manela revealed a pattern of negative American influence in Egypt, which severely
undercut the notion that the United States was on the sidelines during the 1920s.
Most history books address the importance of Egypt in terms of its ancient legacy, the
British occupation and protectorate, and its strategic importance during the Cold War. The most
discussed topic, the Suez Canal, was already a geo-political asset for Britain in the late 19th
century, especially after the 1882 occupation. While the need for control of the Suez Canal was
a constant from the 19th century until its nationalization during the Cold War, other issues were
also important. In the 1920s legal, economic, and political issues in Egypt are salient to
understanding the fluid international system as a whole. The decade after World War I was both
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a decade of western collusion against Egyptian sovereignty and a decade of challenge to the
British colonization of Egypt. The 1924 Egyptian Parliamentary agenda was the manifestation
of a strategy to challenge the remaining obstructions to national sovereignty found in the
reservation clauses of the 1922 British declaration of Egyptian independence and foreign
intrusion.
While the “Wilsonian Moment,” (1918-1919) is crucial to understanding the events to
follow, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 were not limited or contained solely by this one
paradigm. The explanation of events is even more complex, simultaneously going back further
in history and also more deeply immersed in the contemporary historical context. A centuries
old practice known as Capitulations and an Egyptian Capitulation reform strategy known as the
Mixed Courts of Egypt placed heavy burdens on Egypt in the 1920s. United States’ national
policy created tension with Britain, but also participated in the Capitulations systems. Since the
United States opted not to participate directly in the new versions of colonialism following
World War I, namely establishing League of Nations mandates, it was important to maintain
mechanisms of influence in foreign nations. Just as the United States needed the “open door” to
prevent fighting over extra-territorial rights in China, the United States needed to keep the “door
open” in Egypt. However, because of the colonial presence of Great Britain, the only
mechanism available to the United States was a reliance on extra-territorial rights. Because of
the developments of the 1920s, this reliance shrank as a result of Egypt’s strategy evolved into a
national development campaign which depended on the eradication of the Capitulations. In
order to accomplish their national objectives, Egyptian political figures sought to align Egypt
with international developments as they occurred in the 1920s in order to weaken the foreign
control of their government. Despite the United States being a participant in the Capitulations
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practice, Egypt saw opportunity in a new partnership with the United States. Egypt used bilateral and multi-lateral agreements with the United States to weaken the colonial hold of Great
Britain and at the same time exerted leverage on the international situation by being a part of the
new world order envisioned by the United States near the end of the decade.
A new contextual understanding of the 1920s should stress the United States’, Great
Britain’s and Egypt’s national strategies not solely in bi-lateral terms, but would allow for a
larger triangular perspective. This triangular relationship amongst the three nations has several
implications. First, the triangular perspective elevates Egyptian ‘nationalism’ to the status of
political and economic development to which the United States and Great Britain also focused
their attention. Second, it reveals how the Egyptian strategy to incorporate itself into the new
international framework was a successful step in trying to shed the burdens of the Capitulations
and the remaining British colonial presence. Third, the triangular relationship is crucial to
understanding the ambivalent views that the United States had toward the Capitulations and
toward Egypt as a whole. Fourth, it is necessary to understand the relationship of the three
nations because their policies are all nationalistic in the self serving sense, yet a kind of high
stakes negotiation took place bi-laterally between the three nations, in which collusion was
commonplace. Finally, this constructed relationship intertwines the major events of the decade
and the events local to Egypt and paints a more comprehensive image of 1920s diplomacy.
The Impact of Woodrow Wilson on the Political Relations of Great Britain and Egypt
The Egyptians and many other colonized peoples were well aware of the promise that
Wilson’s conception of a new world order offered to nations in similar situations.2 As Manela
argued, the failure of Wilson and the United States to deliver on the political promises of “selfgovernance” and “consent of the governed” disillusioned the Egyptians such as Sa’d Zaghlul, the
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leader of the nationalist Wafd party. Zaghlul possessed only a copy of Wilson’s fourteen points
when arrested by the British authorities for trying to take his grievances to the leaders of the
world during the Paris Peace talks of 1919.3 The Egyptians, aspiring for independence from the
British, refused to reconcile the hypocrisy of the basis of the new world order based on the
consent of the governed.4 Zaghlul felt that the allowance of the British Protectorate to continue
“violated the spirit of the age.”5 As a result of the compounding infractions against Egypt, the
Egyptian political leaders demonstrated a decreased willingness to seek a negotiated, gradual
resolution with Britain within the context of Capitulations throughout the decade. Britain failed
to appease the Egyptians despite the recommendations of the Milner Report of 1919 that Britain
find a way to reconcile the aims of the Protectorate and the agenda of the Wafd.
In terms of American reaction to the developments in Egypt after the Wilsonian moment,
U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Allen Dulles of the State Department’s Near Eastern
Division recommended that the U.S. ignore any petition or letter sent from the Egyptian
nationalists, especially when violence was involved in their tactics.6 Yet the United States
attempted to mitigate the political damage to America’s reputation by attaching wording to their
consent of the British Protectorate government over Egypt in 1919. The unfulfilling attempt
read: “The President and the American people have every sympathy with the legitimate
aspiration of the Egyptian people for a further measure of self-government but they view with
regret any effort to obtain the realization thereof by a resort to violence.”7 The political
explanation for this statement is that Great Britain had urged the United States to support its
endeavor and curb their inflammatory rhetoric of independence because it risked spreading
fanaticism including the possibility of a “holy war against the infidels” according to a
confidential memo send by Arthur Balfour in April 1919 to the British Government.8 The fear of
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extremism around the world (including the spread of Bolshevism) shaped a great deal of U.S.
policy in the 1920s9.
Egypt faced many obstacles to national development long before the Wilsonian moment.
The interference of foreign Powers in Egypt dated back centuries. Just a year prior to the
“universal” call for self- determination, an American representative in Egypt noted that in Egypt
is “anything of political interest is...of a purely domestic character.”10 Hampson Gary, the
American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Cairo, reported that in the spring of 1918,
“the abolition of the Capitulations is the chief subject of political interest in Egypt.”11 Even
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wrote in 1922 that official U.S. recognition of the
British unilateral declaration of independence for Egypt was dependent on “the maintenance of
the rights of the United States of America, as they hitherto existed.” He continued that his
intention was “to leave no room for doubt of the maintenance of capitulatory and commercial
rights and most favored nation treatment for the United States.”12 In this intersection of domestic
reform of centuries old agreements in an international system that prevented unilateral self
remedy, the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s Egypt take on an even more complex meaning.
Egypt framed their political arguments within a much larger discourse that included, but was not
limited to, the disillusionment with Wilson and the West’s hypocrisy. In fact, as the 1920s
progressed, discussion of Wilson disappeared and Egypt focused on other reform issues.
Manela’s recent scholarship addressed an earlier Egyptian nationalism, but described it
as a proto-nationalism at most.13 Manela focuses on the terminology of “the nation” as a post
World War I phenomenon for much of the colonized world. However, the Egyptian strategies
first and foremost were anti-colonial going back to the 19th century. For instance, Husayn alMarsafi’s (1881) The Essay on Eight Words, discusses the concept of “umma” i.e. community or
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nation as his first of eight concepts. Al- Marsafi’s work was one of many political writings of
the 1860s and 1870s that “introduced new themes such as nationalism.”14 As a result, the
strategies of the 1920s fit within a larger post- colonial context that dates back at least until 1869
(Nubar Pasha’s Mixed Courts) and not just the political developments of the “Wilsonian
moment” and the attempted resolution of the First World War.
The Capitulations and the First Egyptian Reform Strategy: The Mixed Courts
The origins and opinions of the Capitulations are varied depending on the author’s
perception of the nature of empire and whether the Capitulations are considered rights verses
privileges.15 Because of the traditionally large numbers of Europeans living in Egypt since the
sixteenth century, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire made certain treaty agreements with
individual European nations to insure a European standard of legal, economic, and political
expectations for visitors. These extra-territorial privileges were called the “Capitulations.” The
agreements were not “imposed by superior force; they were privileges granted as a result of
treaties freely negotiated between equals.”16 A slightly different interpretation illustrated how
much controversy would arise over the nature of these agreements. Evelyn Baring (Lord
Cromer) cited Van Dyck’s work Ottoman Capitulations, which stated that Capitulations were
“letters of privilege” or “sworn diplomas” and this semantic difference was important since the
Ottomans seemingly would not have altruistically concluded treaties providing enumerable rights
with European. The agreements were enticements, privileges, to encourage potential foreign
property holders.17 The American Diplomatic Agent and Consul- General in Cairo in 1918,
himself cited Lord Cromer, which is indicative of the largely paternalistic and self interested
agendas of the foreign powers who benefited from the Capitulations. Cromer argued that the
Egyptians had enough independence from the Ottoman Empire to arrange their own agreements
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with the foreign Powers and thus modify those agreements. As a result, these agreements were
not detrimental to Egypt in Cromer’s opinion.18 Yet by the 1920s, the Egyptians had lost the
ability to modify these diplomatic agreements unilaterally.
The original recipients of the special agreements were the merchants of Venice, Genoa,
and Pisa.19 Later other European countries sought such treaty agreements in order “to confer
upon European Christian communities such immunities from the Shari a Law, and autonomy in
matters of personal status, as to enable them to live with reasonable freedom and convenience in
the Ottoman dominions.”20 The Ottoman Empire benefited as well, for the Capitulations
“encouraged westerners to invest in and do business in Ottoman territories.”21 Over the centuries
and into the nineteenth century, the Capitulations “began to take the form of a compulsory
limitation on the legislative and executive powers of a state.”22 The focus of the tension shifted
from religious and cooperative functionality to commercial and property interest. In order to
protect national business and proprietary interests in Egypt, “diplomatic pressure settled a case
more often then the actual merits.”23 In 1869, Egyptian political leader Nubar Pasha, a minister
in Sultan Ismail’s Egyptian government, argued for a solution to this international problem.24
His solution was the Mixed Courts of Egypt. The same year that Nubar argued for this new
avenue of justice, the Suez Canal opened. The global importance of Suez, especially to Britain,
added yet another layer to Egypt’s problems.
Great Britain, Austria – Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States
attended a conference in 1869 in order to address the already existing concerns over the
protection and enforcement of the Capitulatory rights and Nubar’s concerns.25 This court system
would hypothetically remove the problems regarding foreigners, and by 1875 “onward, any
European who had a claim either against an Egyptian or against the Egyptian Government, had
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no longer been under the necessity of seeking diplomatic support.” 26 Nubar had two main
reasons for desiring this institution. The first one had a direct connection to the then-held
political belief justifying the presence of the Capitulations. Nubar saw in the Courts the
possibility to show that “justice, especially economic justice was possible in Egypt.” If
economic justice was possible in Egypt, then business and foreign investors would be safe,
complacent, and productive. The second desire was to erect a “legal barrier between the
population of Egypt and the capricious despotism of the Khedive.”27 Most in Egypt viewed the
Khedive as a puppet of the British not a servant of the Egyptians. This perception only
exacerbated the underlying foundation of the economic and political battle in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. The Egyptian nationalists of the post World-War I era would eventually
find fault with the Mixed Court as a perpetuation of the Capitulations system of international
relations. The Mixed Courts were viewed by many, before Egyptian objections arose, as a win
for both Egypt and the rest of the world.28
In the original composition of the Mixed Courts, three Courts of First Instance were
situated at the locations of Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansourah. The Court of Appeal was located
in Alexandria. Even during the initial stages, the composition of the court was a contested issue.
The original agreement found that while Egyptian judges had to serve on all benches, “the real
work was done by Europeans.”29 Judges were important because it was not until 1889 that
Egyptian parliament would create laws. The Mixed Courts, composed of a number of judges
from fourteen Capitulatory countries, made the law in Egypt with no existing mechanism to
override a ruling.30 The Mixed Courts mainly ruled on civil and commercial matters. Despite
Nubar Pasha’s original intention for the Courts to include criminal matters, criminal cases were
decided in the consular courts of the defendants’ home country.
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In 1873, the five-year trial period for the Mixed Courts, agreed to by all except France,
did not bring about all of its intended consequences.31 The Mixed Courts actually “had provided
a convenient channel” for diplomatic pressure instead of relieving it. Even in cases within the
legal scope of the Court, political issues still arose. In fact, Khedive Ismail was overthrown in
1881 as part of the Colonel Arabi coup d’état and in part because Europe took him to the Mixed
Courts over his outstanding debts.32 The verdict ordered him to pay, which caused domestic
turmoil.33 For Egypt, the Mixed Courts was an attempt to protect Egyptian national interests in
the international arena, but the solution created a plague for Egyptian domestic politics.
Egypt: Pawn and Backdrop for International Relations
The use of the Mixed Courts had both immediate and long term implications for both
Egypt and the international relations system. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
Great Britain was the junior partner of France in dealing with Egypt.34 Great Britain had little
interest in anything besides an independent Egypt within the context of the Capitulations.35 The
contentious political problem was the enormous debt that the Egyptian Government owed to
Britain as well as other countries. In 1876, Great Britain sent Stephen Cave to audit the Egyptian
credit situation. Cave attempted to alleviate concerns, yet the rest of Europe did not sit quietly as
they saw Great Britain slowly assuming control of Egyptian finances.36 For instance, Germany
had threatened first to use the Mixed Courts in order to regain the money owed to it. If the
courts did not advance German economic interests, other more drastic measures might follow.37
Britain tried to convince France to leave Egypt once Ismail was no longer in power, but
the French did not agree.38 Following another commission to readjust Egypt’s payment of credit,
the tension with Egypt continued.39 The British and French debated their course of action.
Anglo - French Dual Control, without an actual occupation, was still the preferred policy of
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choice in 1881. Neither country sought Dual Occupation as a policy at this time. Some form of
“an accommodation with one of the Egyptian nationalist groups… seemed the most immediately
promising.”40
The conflicting perspectives of the British and French foreign secretaries brought even
more tension to the equation during the fall of 1881. The French Foreign Minister Leon M.
Gambetta and Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Granville had opposite positions on how to
handle the Egyptian situation. Gambetta wanted to scare the Egyptian army and nobles into
shape; whereas, Granville felt that they should “let things dawdle.” Gambetta’s plan had
“destroyed any possibility of co – operation with moderate Egyptian nationalism.”41 Instead of
uniting the army and nobles with Great Britain and France, as Gambetta had hoped, the two
Egyptian groups joined ranks with the growing religious extremist movements of the day. The
new coalition opposed any sort of European intervention, no matter what the intention.42
The extent of the new situation in Egypt was not merely a financial credit adjustment.
The political crisis had developed in a way that now “jeopardiz[ed] the lives of Europeans
residents” in Egypt. Accordingly, the British and French sought a solution that “extricated
themselves from the situation in which M. Gambetta’s precipitancy had placed them.”43 The
Dual Control of France and Great Britain ended when France’s domestic politics moved them
closer to Lord Granville’s previous position. Contrary to the French move and Lord Granville’s
position, the British assumed a much more aggressive role. The British involved themselves
directly in Egyptian domestic politics by overthrowing the nationalistic government in 1882 run
by Colonel Ahmed Pasha Arabi and trying to replace the Khedive, the ruler they had supported
before Arabi’s seizure of power. Following the British military occupation of Egypt in 1882 and
the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, Britain assumed sole control of Egypt.44
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This new situation still posed foreign policy problems for Great Britain because its main
focus was still “maintaining the balance of power in Europe.” Great Britain viewed their
Egyptian entanglement as a “nuisance” and a “distraction from European affairs on which her
traditional foreign policy was based.”45 Nevertheless, Britain rejected a French proposal to
restore Dual Control. In retaliation, France announced defiantly that she would “resume its
liberty of action in Egypt.” This defiance “amounted to an unrelenting and unreasoning hostility
to Great Britain in Egypt which was persisted in every method short of war for a period of
twenty years.”46 Following the Entente Cordiale, the Capitulations dominated foreign policy
decisions concerning Egypt for both Egypt and the rest of the Powers. This was the last open
door for the Great Powers besides Britain to operate in Egypt.47 Great Britain’s policy evolved
into its second phase when Great Britain declared Egypt a Protectorate, claiming to have special
ties to Egypt.
The British Protectorate of Egypt began in 1914. The relationship was symbiotic in the
eyes of the British economic interests which sought to protect Egypt’s cotton markets and the
Suez from Turkish threats.48 While the Egyptian constitutionalist party was against the Khedive,
they felt that it would be detrimental to force or ask the British to leave because of the looming
Turkish threat, which materialized on November 6, 1914, when Turkey and Great Britain
declared war on each other. As World War I increased the usual importance of the Suez Canal,
the “imperial lifeline to India,”49 Great Britain “would take upon herself the whole burden of the
defense of Egypt.”50 Because of the “self imposed mission” to protect Egyptian and therefore
British interests, total independence was not an option that Britain could offer Egypt.51
In 1917, as Ahmed Fuad had begun his rule as Sultan, the British domestic political
situation was tenuous. Britain considered tightening their control of Egypt; however, they could
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not do it because of resulting outcry from the nationalists.52 The tension existed not only in
Great Britain, but also the rest of Europe, which reacted negatively to a British commission
calling for judicial and capitulation reform.53 This tension was notable also in Egypt, where, in
March of 1917, the Egyptian Council of Ministers appointed a Capitulations Commission to
consider reforming the system.
The effect of the “Wilsonian moment” on Egypt’s political situation resulted in much
more than disillusionment. It also created a chasm in Egyptian politics from the British and
American perspective. Isolated as the “extremist nationalists” Zaghlul and the Wafd, the
political party arising out of his attempted delegation to the Paris Peace talks, received no respect
from the West. This split created a new bargaining partner for the British. Egyptian political
figures such as the newly elected post war Prime Minister Mohamed Said Pasha were not
associated with the “extremism” of Zaghlul. They were viewed as being more “moderate” and
as possessing a sense of “tact and moral courage.” The more conservative Egyptians,
while desiring an Egypt for Egyptians as sincerely as their more radical
compatriots, realized that such a thing is impossible at this time, and so they have
simply held out for an elective Parliament and a responsible Ministry, and for the
proposition that a larger number of higher government posts be given to Egyptians
[italics mine for emphasis].54
In light of the Milner Report, it was with this part of the Egyptian political elite that Great Britain
sought to minimize the costs of maintaining a minimal yet effective hold on Egypt.
The culmination of this appeasement strategy was the 1922 unilateral declaration of
Egyptian independence. Great Britain retained four important reservations that hindered actual
Egypt sovereignty. The reservations concerned British control of the Suez Canal, Egyptian
defense and foreign policy, the Sudan, and the continuance of the Capitulations. Egyptian
Parliament drafted a constitution in 1923 to begin their quest for self governance, yet the

12

government dissolved often. Tensions between Britain and Egypt reached a boiling point after
the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in 1924. In this context, Egypt initiated a new strategy to
address the obstacles to independence.55
The 1924 Reform Strategy of the Egyptian Parliament56
In 1924, in the first session of Egypt’s Parliament outlined its agenda for reforming and
improving Egypt.57 The most pertinent features on the agenda were the general revision of law
and policy governing Parliament, enabling it to act more effectively, the “overhauling of the
fiscal system” to ensure a more equitable tax system, Egypt’s entry into the League of Nations,
and complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan.58 By the end of July, the attempt to raise
import duty 15% and improve the fiscal system had failed. 59 The international Capitulatory
cartel stood in the way of Egypt altering their own tax system. The Egyptians had made some
bold political moves in the session. Parliament decided that it would no longer pay for the
British military presence, which indicated that acceptance of the British military was over. If
Great Britain had to pay for its presence, then it no longer could use the claim that Egypt
welcomed the British military establishment. Another decision with implications for British
policy was the Egyptian Parliament’s decision not to pay the interest on the loans incurred during
the period of Ottoman rule. It decided that instead the money was to be “deposited in the
national bank of Egypt until the question is settled by negotiation.”60 The notion that Egypt in
the post-Ottoman, post Dual-Occupation, and post- British Protectorate, period was responsible
for the loans was rejected. Also, the contested interest payments would accumulate interest for
Egypt rather than Britain.
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In January 1924, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes revealed the strain as well as
the potential of American foreign policy concerning Egypt. In a speech to the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York. Hughes noted
The new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by
attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome intervention, but by candor, directness,
and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence
upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which
affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the
Orient and the Occident may find ground for cooperation and the maintenance of
peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.61
In other words, Hughes’ foreign policy objectives both challenged Great Britain’s traditional
foreign policy and yet simultaneously sought the assurances of Capitulations to protect and
enhance U.S. interests in the region through reciprocal agreements. Until the potential onset of
these new reciprocal relationships, international relations was still dependent on the currency of
extra-territorial rights, especially for the United States which had a less formal experience with
colonialism in the Near East. At the same time that his policy was grounded in the traditional
Western Orientalism, the possibility for a new modus operandi in international relations seemed
very real because of the concept of reciprocal treatment and the international reputation of the
Secretary. Hughes had gained political clout following his impressive showing at the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 in which he proposed a new agreement concerning
naval arms limitations that would balance the naval conflict between the Powers and recognize
the rising influence of the United States in the international system.62
Economic Strategies for Capitulation Reform
In the late summer and fall of 1924, one of the economic concerns Egypt faced was the
international consensus regarding Egypt’s responsibility to repay three loans taken during the
Ottoman era of Egypt in 1855, 1891, and 1894. These loans were assumed by the British
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following the outbreak of World War I; however, it is important to note that the British had
occupied Egypt since 1882.63 The British Foreign Office viewed it as just another ploy by the
nationalists to evade paying legal obligations. The United States used similar rhetoric as the
British in terms of labeling Egyptians that felt it necessary to repay the loans as “responsible” or
“moderate” as opposed to the “extremists” of the Wafd party, which often demanded complete
and immediate independence and rejection of the loans.64 The United States’ counselor in the
London embassy, F.A. Sterling, agreed that “all three loans represent[ed] simply a small part of
the Ottoman Debt which was taken over by Egypt and for which Egypt is both morally and
legally responsible.” Sterling cited as evidence the fact that “responsible” Egyptian businessmen
think the loans should be repaid in order to avoid having future financial credit problems.65
Unlike the Capitulatory powers, Zaghlul Pasha questioned Egypt’s liability for these
loans.66 Zaghlul argued that “when Egypt went to war against Turkey [in World War I], the
tribute ceased and with it the power of delegation and the debt itself.” He continued that Egypt
had not defaulted because “Egypt had given neither promise nor guarantee to the bondholders”
and had paid “with regularity the interest on all debts she had acknowledged.” Howell
interpreted the implications of Zaghlul’s remarks to mean that “if there are any guarantors of the
bonds, [they] are the British and French Governments and not the Egyptian Government.”67
As a result of the Parliamentary suspension of payments already discussed, bondholders
sued Egypt and took the case to the Mixed Courts.68 British policy had not changed since July
1924 when it had rejected the claim that Egypt was not responsible for the loans. The United
States response was dismissive in nature and the U.S. diplomatic correspondence described the
Egyptian Parliament as being “confused,” in order to discredit their motives and abilities. This
analysis strikingly applies to Timothy Mitchell’s concept of colonization which applied

15

Foucault’s concepts of power through control of space and order. In Mitchell’s work and in the
1924 correspondence, the perceived ‘dis’order of the Orient was contrasted with the order of the
West.69
If there was any doubt about the possibility of justice for Egypt in the Mixed Courts, the
Court’s decision to side with the bondholders’ claims eliminated it.70 Already in 1924 the Mixed
Courts came under fire from the Egyptians. The Egyptian legation situated in London demanded
that the issue should be resolved at the International Court at The Hague.71 This was a maneuver
by the Egyptians to create a new venue of justice. The current venue, the Mixed Courts, was the
favored old colonial venue for the British to discuss this matter. The Court no longer provided
Egyptians with any assurances of a fair hearing. How could a court maintained and infiltrated by
capitulatory abuses provide the setting for a hearing on the illegality of loans incurred under
colonial rule and the threats of debt offered by the Capitulatory Powers? The Egyptians for this
reason needed to find recourse outside the Mixed Courts of Egypt. This change of venue had
implications for United States–Egyptian relations later in the decade as well.
Egyptian political leaders had many financial strategies to improve their political
situation and lurking in the background of every idea and plan for advancement was the baggage
of the Capitulations. One such political figure is Sidky Pasha, former minister of finance and
twice elected Minister of the Interior. He argued in March 1926 before the Mixed Courts Bar in
Cairo that despite the budget surplus, which was viewed in favorable terms by foreign
governments and investors, Egypt, in fact, needed to secure more funding. The time had come
for Egyptians to build a better infrastructure for themselves, including irrigation projects, health
care, communications, and transportation. Sidky foresaw economic decline, if the necessary
measures were not taken. According to J. Morton Howell, the Envoy Extraordinary Minister
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Plenipotenary to Egypt, “his speech is significant as to what is desired along these lines indicated
by all, or nearly all of Egypt’s leading politicians.”72 The majority of the tax revenue came from
land, building, cotton export taxes, and customs. However, for the most part, local taxes
accounted for much of the national revenue, which accounted for the shortfall in Sidky’s opinion.
One of the reasons explaining the shortfall was that the commercial class was often not taxed.
Many foreigners in Egypt belonged to this economic class.73
Sidky framed the needed increase in tax revenue debate within the Capitulations
discourse. Instead of focusing on how Capitulations were the root of the future Egyptian
financial crisis, he used the concept of the Capitulations, which were so often invoked by foreign
Powers, to Egypt’s advantage. He argued that the burden of the taxation should fall not just on
the poor agricultural classes, but “should rest equally on foreigners and Egyptians alike.” This
was the original purpose for the Capitulations, to protect against unfair and unequal treatment of
foreigners living in Egypt (e.g. poll taxes for people not permanently residing in Egypt), so Sidky
argued the principal should work in reverse as well. He even went as far as to say that just as the
foreign Powers had agreed in the Declaration of London March 17, 1880 amongst themselves to
ensure “equity of their nationals in Egypt,” this same equity should have applied to a “manifestly
unfair” tax system that hindered the growing needs of Egypt.
In addition to framing the debate in terms of the Capitulations, Sidky took the issue a step
farther. He viewed Capitulations as instances when former Egyptian governments placated
foreigners “instead of standing on matters of principle” and an incompatible burden on Egypt’s
political progress. Sidky based his strongest argument for the abolition of Capitulations not only
on a sense of injustice, but also in the contemporaneous international situation.74 The Treaty of
Lausanne of 1922-23 both revised the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and ended the practice of the
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Capitulations in Turkey. He felt the abolishment of the practice in Turkey should also apply to
Egypt.
Later in 1926, Allan Dulles of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Division
wrote a memo detailing a conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Samy Pasha. Samy’s
strategy was similar to Sidky’s because he also felt that after the abolition of the Capitulations in
Turkey, the same should happen in Egypt. However, Samy added another layer to his strategy.
He appealed to the United States arguing that because of rampant tax evasion and the lack of
income taxes a new system was needed. The new system had to be based on the abolition of
extraterritorial rights and the creation of a new more equitable system. Samy Pasha appealed to
the United States to be a leader and be the first to renounce the capitulations system which in
Samy’s opinion, would have forced the other nations to do the same. This appeal to the U.S. to
be a leader in the international system was difficult. While Dulles discussed the possibility of
modification of the broken tax system, the opinions of the other Powers would have to be
considered before the U.S. acted.75 The United States would not be a leader in a cause to
renounce the only measures that maintain its access to Egypt for the sake of the Egyptian cause.
While the state of international relations was in flux in the 1920s, the United States was fighting
to maintain its open door policy in the face of exclusionary European politics. Yet it was
unwilling to challenge the foundation of the old colonial system that handicapped the national
development strategies of not only Egypt but the United States as well.
As a result of the failed attempts at rejecting the Ottoman loans and not completely
successful attempt at raising revenue through other tax plans, the Egyptian government rejected
the advice of the foreign financial advisors in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance to push the
publication of the budget back until June 1, 1927. The Egyptian government set the date for the
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first of May. While this might seem a ‘tit for tat’ strategy, the political move is more relevant
when placed in its proper context as:
An indication of the determined and steady trend of Egyptian politics toward
freedom from foreign influences. This tendency is shown in the disregard of
advice and warnings given by foreign advisors and foreign government employees
who are subjected to sarcastic and at times, disrespectful treatment [Italics mine
for emphasis].76
The likelihood political compromise had diminished as “the agitation for the complete abolition
of the capitulations was on in campaign form.” Most likely the proposed policy of closing
national consular courts in favor of a shift to the Mixed Courts was no longer acceptable to the
Egyptians. The political perception relayed to Washington from Cairo was that “privileges
[capitulations] and immunities are withheld more readily than extended.”77
Another Egyptian fiscal reform maneuver that alarmed foreign nations involved
collecting taxes from foreigners. In a move that characterizes much of the American diplomacy
of the 1920s, Secretary of State Henry Stimson contacted his American representatives in Egypt
in 1929 to inform them the U.S. would agree to pay the Ghaffir tax when other countries agreed
to do so.78 The tax issue, previously raised in 1923, was an Egyptian attempt to reform their tax
laws and secure funding for public works by extending the mandatory requirements for paying
the Ghaffir tax to foreigners living in Egypt. In essence, it was a public safety tax. The funds
would pay for an Egyptian security force. The foreign nations had always counted on free riding
the British military occupation of Egypt as their source of safety. Now Egypt sought the ability
to offer security to individuals and businesses with proper funding. U.S. Secretary of State
Charles E. Hughes in addition to citing international laws and protocols from the thirteenth
century also cited the Real Estate Protocol of 1874 between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire.
Hughes claimed that this agreement did in fact allow for the collection of a property tax from
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American citizens, but the proposed extension of the tax was actually an extra tax on tenants and
dwellers, exceeding the usual domain of property owners in Egypt. In addition to challenging
the legal principles of the tax, Hughes also challenged the collection and distribution methods of
the tax.79
Unlike the Vacuum Oil company, which often appealed to the State Department to
protect its interests, utilizing capitulatory objections to paying the tax all together, J. Morton
Howell shared a different view of American responsibilities in paying the tax.80 While Howell
did not necessarily think that it was the Americans “moral duty” to pay the tax as the Egyptian
prime minister did, Howell advised Americans in Egypt to pay the tax if at all possible. If they
felt the need to pay it under protest or with the caveat that if the Mixed Courts returned a verdict
prohibiting the collection of the tax, the American payers would be justly compensated.81
Eventually, Vacuum Oil communicated their views to the U.S. Government as having
No objection, in principle, to paying at a reasonable rate for actual service
rendered. In the case of the Ghaffir tax, we feel there is no assurance whatsoever
of service adequate to justify the payment of the tax, on any basis, and we should
in all probability be forced to maintain, as at present, our own force of guardians.
However, assuming the situation so develops that payment of this tax becomes
obligatory; it would appear that the present basis proposed for assessment is not
immoderate [Italics mine for emphasis].82
This assessment by the only American oil company operating in Egypt at the time revealed the
essence of the strange post-colonial issues that faced Egypt in the 1920s. Once again, the labels
of “reasonable” and “moderate” play an important rhetorical role in identifying how the failures
of the United States to support the nationalism of Egypt went far beyond that of the “Wilsonian
Moment.” As the United States government participated in the rhetoric of Orientalism, so did its
national economic interests. The key element of the passage is the concept of “assurance.” At
its core meaning, this is the root of the Capitulations and all the baggage that came afterwards.
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The foreign powers needed a mechanism to protect their own foreign policy in the fluid nature of
the international framework in the 1920s. This search for a mechanism to protect national
interests is the same goal of the strategies of Egypt, Britain, and the United States.
However, the Egyptian economic reforms had not completely isolated the United States.
In 1926 after the Parliamentary agenda was in full swing, the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce
and King Fuad signed into law a reduction in the cotton tax enacted in 1920 under the control of
British imperial trade policy. The cotton tax was reduced to twenty piastres from twenty- five in
1922 and thirty-five in 1920. This political- economic, diplomatic move fit rather nicely into the
new economic order sought by Herbert Hoover, serving as Secretary of Commerce from 192127. International trade was the foundation of Hoover’s new world order and government
controls on foreign raw materials raised flags at Hoover’s department. While the United States
pursued the “Open Door” in terms of oil, archaeology, and politics, the traditional economic
interests are also important for the triangular relationship of the three countries. While, Herbert
Hoover and his assistant Julius Klein, created information agencies around the globe to facilitate
better trade relationships and business opportunities, the United States also won the battle that
began at the Genoa Conference in 1922 about what the new gold standard would be. The British
lost their position as the leading world’s creditor in mid-decade, as most of the world switched to
the system backed by the United States. It was no coincidence that the new economic order that
challenged the more nationalistic trade barriers before 1919 took effect simultaneously with the
Egyptian strategy.83
Legal Reform Strategies
The proposed revision of the Mixed Courts was in and of itself already a strategy to
reform an institution which main purpose was to reform the Capitulations agreements, relics
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from the days that the Ottoman Empire ruled Egypt. The matters of concern pertained to the sale
of narcotics, white slave trade, trade fraud, the number of judges on the courts, the possibility for
Egyptians to become the President and Vice President of Mixed Courts, and the possibility for
Egypt to give awards to judges on the Mixed Courts for their service.84 The reasons for the
change in the number and nationality of judges is better understood after reviewing the triangular
diplomatic dance of the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt involving the Mixed Courts in
the 1920s.
Reforming the Mixed Courts was not solely in the interests of the Egyptians. Already in
February of 1921, Great Britain wrote to the United States that the British were seeking to
modify the privileges to “protect the country” in hopes of appeasing the Egyptian nationalists. 85
While the memo referred to protecting the country of Egypt, if the reference is put into a
historical and diplomatic context, “protecting the country” also meant protecting Great Britain.
The framework of the proposed arrangement created the context within which foreign nations
sought justice in Egypt.
The specifics were that Great Britain, still then the protectorate power, wanted every
nation to close its consular courts. The controversy between the United States and Great Britain
was the foundation of diplomatic maneuverings to come. Without damaging national interests,
Great Britain could only soothe the Egyptian nationals’ complaints after other countries in Egypt
closed their consular courts, in order to maintain their self appointed special relationship with
Egypt.86 If the United States closed its courts, then at least Britain would not have to worry
about being the only nation to lose power due to the nationalist movement in Egypt. Along with
these closures, the British initially sought to “reorganize and extend the jurisdiction of the Mixed
Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation enacted by the Egyptian
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legislature.”87 The British promised both no discriminatory policies vis- à- vis the United States
and the transfer of authority to the Egyptians with the quid pro quo of the closure of all foreign
consular courts.88 The United States responded in July 1921, to a telegram from 1920, about this
issue.89 The United States did not wish to possess privileges that were detrimental to Egypt.
This self-denying statement had a caveat attached to it, on the British proposal to end the
consular courts. The Americans had concerns about the British selecting the consular courts as
the mechanism to achieve their goals. The Americans sought some sort of assurance concerning
the type of government and the type of justice that would exist in Egypt once the American
consular courts ceased to function. The U.S. Secretary of State’s Charles Evans Hughes
response was legal in nature and sought to frame the discussion in terms of American justice.
Citing an Act of Congress from 1874, the United States could and would close their
consular courts when American justice was available in a venue that could protect American
interests. 90 Charles Hughes also wrote that his country possessed treaties with both the
Ottomans and Egypt and only bilateral negotiations with Egypt could have affected them in any
way. One of the most important points on the British proposal was that “any renunciation of
rights and privileges… would in effect be made in favor of Egypt,” not Great Britain.91 The
United States was not going to negotiate through Great Britain about American rights and
privileges. The U.S. sought to deal directly with Egypt. In 1921, the United States demanded
“most favorable nation status” for trade and diplomatic standing.92 This demand carried the
potential to diminish Britain’s status, for the British had already promised the Americans equal
treatment to Great Britain. Yet Great Britain, while Britain could offer a similar status and
treatment, it could in fact not agree to the status of America as a most favored nation because
that status would undermine the vision that Britain had of itself as a protectorate power.93
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While the Americans maintained objections, they stated that shifting to the Mixed Courts
away from the consular courts as a modus operandi “would probably not be objectionable.”94
Great Britain and the United States also demonstrated an ability to agree on other international
issues such as American schools in Egypt. While the United States had softened its position on
the abolition of the consular courts, it demanded more information about this new system that
Britain wanted to establish in Egypt, and it wanted the information shared with other countries to
prevent misunderstandings.95 While seemingly an innocent request, this sort of sharing of
information and decision making influence could discretely steal power away from Great Britain.
Within this larger context of international support for the Mixed Courts amidst diplomatic
maneuvering over legal and political overtures, a smaller battle took place in 1921. That battle
involved the replacement of retired Judge Somerville Tuck. The United States was reminded
that it could nominate a successor to the retired American judge. Two nominees were put forth,
yet both were rejected for seemingly unknown reasons. Pierre Crabitès and Ellery Stowell both
possessed the necessary skills. Crabitès was then serving on the District Court in Cairo and
Stowell was well trained according to Hughes. Hughes wrote to the British Ambassador in a
tone conveying disbelief. His agitation was evident in his finding that earlier, in 1919, the
British had approved a man named Philip Marshall Brown to be a possible successor to Judge
Tuck. Mr. Brown had no legal training and possessed none of the desirable attributes of the
rejected judges.96 The eventual acceptance of another nominee for the Court of Appeals, Jasper
Yeats Brinton, allowed the U.S. to agree to a continuation of the Mixed Courts with American
representation protected.97
The restoration of the number of American judges was an important diplomatic episode.
It allowed the United States to agree to the continuation of the Courts, but also because in 1921,
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Great Britain had added two more British judges to the Court of Appeals and one to the District
Court. The country with the closest number of judges was Italy with five, two less than Britain’s
seven. France, Belgium, the United States, and Greece all had four positions.98 In the larger
context, the political elements of this particular drama are representative of the tension between
Britain and the United States in the 1920s concerning the gold standard, rubber, and naval arms.
Contrary to Jasper Y. Brinton’s claims about the non- political motives amongst the nations
concerning the promotion of judges, the denial of Crabitès as worthy and capable of a promotion
to the Court of Appeals appeared to be nothing but political.99 In March 1921, Crabitès had
already earned a reputation as the American judge who had ruled in favor of expanding the
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include cases of public domain. His public domain ruling
allowed the opening the tomb of King Tutankhamen in the interest of “science and civilization”
over any claims of national rights of the Egyptians. The Egyptians later blamed an accident that
caused Crabitès to have one of his legs amputated on the curse of King Tut.100 This animosity
over the ruling could have easily contributed to the unwillingness to promote him to the Court of
Appeals, especially in the context of the British appeasement of Egyptian nationalism.
As was the case with the Ghaffir tax, the Egyptian Government began to flex its muscles
in other areas of international interest. Another pressing issue for the U.S. State Department was
the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s claim to the promised fifty percent of the artifacts recovered
from all excavations, a custom since the 1912 Egyptian law that granted the rights to the
American archaeologists. The archaeologists petitioned the State Department for assistance,
because without the guaranteed returns from the digs, they would no longer be able to excavate
the sites.101 Hughes instructed Howell to gauge what Britain’s, France’s, and Italy’s opinions
were on the expiration of the 1912 law that affected them as well. Strangely enough, Howell

25

was not instructed to speak with the Egyptian authorities on the matter. His instructions were to
build a coalition, and if the coalition was not possible or if the other powers had already
independently sought remedies, Howell was to contact Hughes before making another move.
Hughes wanted to be forceful with the Egyptians in the negotiations. 102 He felt that the
Egyptians should take the assistance of the needed foreign archaeologists, on the archaeologists’
terms, or lose them all together. British high society and diplomats were already underway in
their opposition to any changes in the status quo. Both the United States and Great Britain
opposed the idea of granting Egypt ownership and distribution rights of all unearthed
materials.103 The opposition led to a one-year continuance of the 1912 law because a long-term
agreement was then impossible.
Nearing the completion of this moratorium, the talks resumed. The discussion among the
American diplomats focused primarily on the timing of the talks in conjunction with an appeal in
the Mixed Courts involving King Tut archaeologist Howard Carter. The issue was the legality of
Crabitès’ public domain ruling that led to the unearthing of King Tut’s Tomb.104 The
Metropolitan Museum conducted the substantive diplomacy with Egyptian authorities. The
bottom line of their argument was that in order to finance not only the excavating trips, but also
the exhibits back home, certain assurances were needed to make their excavations profitable.105
Egypt did not want to be restricted legally with a fifty percent guarantee. The Egyptians wanted
to have first choice in any objects found in order to complete collections and to have the primary
collection in their own country. Only after their own needs were met would Egypt distribute the
artifacts.106 The British and American shared interests in protecting the foreign archaeologists
forged a temporary alliance against the actions of a determined Egyptian nationalist
movement.107 Business interests and institutional involvement initiated both the British and
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American presence in Egypt and likewise, the corresponding diplomatic pressure to protect those
interests. The US seemed content as long as its interests were protected, whether through
diplomatic channels or the mixed court.
As the new regulations concerning archaeological excavations went into effect under
protest in the Mixed Courts, the conflict between the foreign archaeologists and the Egyptians
continued into 1926.108 The new Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, communicated the
proposed plan of action to Howell in Egypt. Howell was to discuss confidentially the matter
with the British and French Foreign Offices. Kellogg had composed a proposal for the Egyptians
to consider. The proposal was a fine example of salesmanship. The mechanism that Kellogg
suggested was that the Egyptians complete their own collections first and then offer equivalent
pieces to participating American excavators. Kellogg focused on trying to convince the Egyptian
officials that most of the archaeological contributions in the past twenty-five years have been
made possible through the assistance of American institutions. He continued that the
relationship was beneficial to both countries. American universities and museums were enriched
both culturally and financially. These exhibits also led to an increase in tourism for Egypt.
Kellogg explained that what made foreign excavators and institutions nervous was that the
assurances of receiving compensation for their work disappeared with the enforcement of the
1912 law. The United States understood the need to lower the percentage, but some sort of
objective assurance was needed.109
The British would not support Kellogg’s proposal until Austen Chamberlain, the British
Foreign Secretary, was convinced by the French who were also worried about their investments
in Egypt and the rise of the United States.110 Eventually various American institutions, as the
diplomatic ordeal continued, reached an agreement with the Egyptian government. The
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American legation of experts and archaeologists in Egypt had reached verbal agreements with
the Egyptian government, but the American institutions, including museums, called for the U.S.
to intervene to assure that their goals would be met.111 The American Minister in Egypt
attempted to get the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister to insert legal language that would insure
that the American archaeologists and institutions would profit from their work. Despite the
Egyptian Minister’s deletion of most of the assurances sought by the Americans, within two
months the American legation informed the Secretary of State that the legation had decided to
“accept the Egyptian Government’s assurances of liberal intentions,” even without the legal
guarantees.112 Following the Mixed Courts’ ruling that Egypt had the right to determine their
own laws regarding antiquities, the “liberal” offer was the best offer available. A much different
ruling was possible if Judge Crabitès had been promoted to the same Court and heard the appeals
case stemming from his ruling.
The distribution formula of archaeological finds was not the only issue resolved in 1926.
A source of contention between the United States and Great Britain since 1920 was the
conviction of a British citizen by an American Consul at Alexandria. Great Britain’s objection
from 1920 remained the same in 1926. The British contention was that the United States had no
authority to try any British national in an American consular court. The Americans argued case
precedent, which established a long standing tradition of treating foreign nationals who willing
sought refuge aboard an American ship as part of the crew. As a result, these foreign nationals
were also subject to the laws that govern that ship. The British viewed this American
international jurisprudence as “unjustifiable,” an “error on the part of local United States
Authorities.” Most importantly, that it was imperative to “prevent reoccurrence.”113 The
magnitude of this diplomatic encounter would not register on most scales, if not for the six years
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of legal arguments between the United States and Great Britain since the British sailor’s prison
term was only fourteen days.114
The entirety of the diplomatic spat entailed the unacceptability of the method of justice
by the United States to Great Britain. The consular courts traditionally tried cases involving only
the same nationality, yet the United States argued that the sailor was part of the crew of an
American flagged vessel and under U.S. law. If this premise was accepted, then the American
consul was allowed to handle criminal cases with penalties less than a hundred dollars and less
than sixty-day jail terms.115 According to American law, the verdict was final in these
circumstances. In 1860, Congress passed a law stating that United States consuls were to be
regarded and held to the standards of a judicial officer. Britain, as with every other country,
followed its own guidelines for conducting consular courts. A network of local and provincial
British courts was under a supreme consular court that empanelled a six-person jury.
While the objection to the conviction of the sailor was but a microcosm of the larger
debate about the role of the judicial system and foreign political influence in Egypt, this
relatively larger debate between Great Britain and the United States about justice and political
influence revealed their political motives about Egypt. Though independent, the only function
Egypt served in the whole exchange was serving as a host site for the consular courts. The
United States’ Secretary of State argued that the imprisoned sailor “owe[d] for that time to the
country to which the ship on which he is serving belongs, a temporary allegiance, and must be
held to all its responsibilities.”116 Britain’s objections, placed in a larger context, revealed that it
sought to maximize its political position in Egypt by utilizing this particular case as a basis for
demanding the closure of all American consular courts that could jeopardize British foreign
policy objectives. Not surprisingly, neither country drew the rather ironic parallel between the
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sailor’s “temporary allegiance” and the disregard for Egyptian sovereignty that both the United
States and Great Britain exercised in conducting their consular justice and demand for the
Capitulations on Egyptian soil.
From 1926, through the beginning of 1927, the United States and Egypt bantered back
and forth about reform of the Mixed Courts and proportional American representation in the
Courts. The Egyptians maintained that they had always reserved the right to choose their own
judges.117 The United States grew more demanding in their need to be recognized as the world
power they had become.118 Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, steered the U.S.’s diplomacy
down a historical path that was similar to that of the British. Kellogg argued about proportional
representation and refused to consent immediately to Egyptian proposals to strengthen or merely
to relocate their own institutions. He and American businesses in Egypt directly challenged
Egyptian civil authorities. The United States and American companies argued that Egypt had a
double standard for petroleum storage by allowing Greek companies to use illegal and unsafe
storage barges. The main motivation for involvement of the United States’ government was that
American companies were paying extra fees for the stipulations laid out by the Egyptian
Parliament.119 The objection was that special privileges given to Greek companies could not be
tolerated.120 The irony of the parallels to the Capitulations was seemingly lost on the Americans
arguing the case.
The proposed changes to the Mixed Courts drew many international responses. Lord
George Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, refused to acknowledge any aspects of
the proposal until the anti- British public relations campaign stopped in the newspapers. Lloyd
felt that instead of airing their grievances in public, the reforms should be circulated in private
among the Powers.121 Regarding the particulars of the Egyptian proposal, extending the
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jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include criminal matters concerned Lloyd. Britain saw no
reason why the President or Vice President could not be Egyptian; however, the position did not
have to be necessarily Egyptian. Also, Great Britain demanded one of the foreign seats if the
number of judges was reduced or a new chamber created.122 Much in the same manner as
Britain, Italy and France had serious concerns about the reforms, and unless they were rewarded
with the potentially scarce judicial seats, they refused to reduce the number of judges. As North
Winship of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted in his memo, if Italy
and France were to get seats in a general reduction of total judgeships, that would inevitably lead
to strife amongst the Powers about the proportionality of representation and capitulatory
rights.123
The response of the United States to the Egyptian proposal was similar to that of Great
Britain. Franklin Mott Gunther, the American minister to Cairo, informed the Egyptian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Hafez Afifi Bey, that as long as the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed
Courts was applicable to U.S. law and previous agreements between the two nations, that the
proposal was acceptable. The United States positioned its support of the creation of a new
chamber as quid pro quo for one of those seats going to an American judge. The foundation of
the United States argument was that the positions on a proposed new chamber should decided on
a “principal of equality.” It is of interest that this concept of ‘equality’ was the foundation of
both the arguments for the continuation of the Capitulations by the foreign powers and by the
Egyptians calling for an end to the extra- territorial privileges. While the Egyptians had
proposed the creation of a new chamber of judges, both the United States and Great Britain
increased the acceptable minimum number of judges to five in their respective correspondence
with Egypt in order to increase their odds against Egyptian nationalism.124
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Along with the “principle of equality”, the United States had another issue with the
selection of judges that had pestered the United States the entire previous decade. Gunther
notified the State Department that he had deleted the last line of text from the message for the
Egyptian Minister. The deleted line read: “It is felt that outstanding judicial ability should be the
sole criterion upon which election to these offices should be based.” He responded to
Washington that judicial ability “does not represent the principle traditionally followed by the
Mixed Court judiciary in the conduct of elections” and for this reason, the line that he omitted
was “unrealistic.” Traditionally seniority played a much larger role in the election and
promotion of judges on those Courts.125 This was the very same issue that plagued the United
States during the Judge Pierre Crabitès’ controversy earlier in the decade. The United States
wanted to keep pace with the other Powers and definitely resorted to playing the Capitulations
card when needed. However, if the United States could have had judges serving on the Mixed
Courts based on judicial ability as opposed to qualifications based on the Capitulations, national
interests on many different levels would have been served.
A New World Order for International Relations a Decade after Wilson
The newly elected government of Prime Minister Sarwat Pasha called for a Capitulations
conference for 1928 to address ridding Egypt of the onerous Capitulations. The Egyptian
strategy involved having the Capitulations “replaced by an institution more in harmony with
modern times.” Despite praising Sarwat’s realism, North Winship, of the State Department Near
Eastern Division, also portrayed Sarwat Pasha in the same manner as Great Britain. The United
States and Britain defined “moderate” Egyptian political figures as being less demanding than
the more “extremist” group the Wafd.126 Egypt’s dilemma was the same in 1927 as it was in
1919, wanting Wilson’s words of national self- determination to apply to them, yet they were
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still confronting the centuries old practice of the Capitulations that fostered both Orientalist and
colonial foreign policy in Egypt. The Egyptian strategy also enlarged to attack the nature of the
1922 reservations claimed by Britain just as the Treaty of Lausanne presented the Egyptians with
material to fuel their argument for the abolition of the Capitulations.127 After learning of the
results from Lausanne, Egyptians wanted the Capitulations abolished in Egypt especially if
Europe had agreed to abolish the Capitulations in Turkey, the former seat of government for the
Ottoman Empire. The maintenance of the Capitulations was also one of the four reservations
Britain placed on the independence of Egypt in 1922. A strategy to abolish the Capitulations
was both a challenge to British colonialism and the international system that perpetuated the
Capitulatory abuses in Egypt.

Within an international system in flux, the Egyptians utilized the

opportunities presented through the diplomatic events of the 1920s to weaken the colonial ties to
Britain and their former occupier the Ottomans.
In the opinion of Lord Lloyd, if the powers were interested in maintaining the
Capitulations, they needed to address the concerns of the Egyptians and not ignore them.128
After a decade of diplomatic wrangling over and among both Foreign and Egyptian
governments, the British Foreign Ministry issued a text to the Egyptian Government that
revealed the “extreme limit to which British Government would go” to meet the demands of the
more moderate nationalists.129 Much like the Egyptian strategy, Great Britain felt that a new
mechanism was needed to ensure the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. In sum, Great
Britain sought to establish an alliance with Egypt. This goal contradicted the rhetoric used
during the Protectorate Phase and throughout the 1920s about Britain’s special relationship with
Egypt. The creation of a new alliance implied that the previous one was false and imposed upon
Egypt. The new relationship would be more reciprocal and required ambassadors and outlined
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policies in the case of third party (nation) disputes.130 A policy for both bilateral and multilateral
relations was a significant change from the days of the High Commissioner and of preventing the
Egyptians from making bilateral agreements with any other party. Disputes would be settled
peacefully fitting within the general political will of the time epitomized by the Kellogg-Briand
Pact and through the diplomatic channels provided by Egypt’s entrance into the League of
Nations.131
Great Britain was ready to make both the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt the
responsibility of the Egyptian Government; however, the issue of the Capitulations blocked
change. This British acknowledgement that the Capitulations were no longer consistent with the
modern world was the only concession to Egypt included in the communication.132 The same
strategy that had existed since 1920 would still govern policy liberalization. Britain would
relinquish its Capitulatory rights once other countries abandoned the use of consular courts in
Egypt as opposed to the Mixed Courts.133 This focus on changing the venue of justice played a
major role in the British proposal.
Several areas of negotiation still favored Britain. One such issue was the Suez Canal. No
matter what the British relinquished in their proposal, Suez was not on the British negotiating
table. Much like in the 1922 reservations on complete independence, the British still reserved a
place for themselves in the chance that Egypt would seek foreign advice both political and
military. The most likely reason being to prevent the Egyptians from seeking assistance from the
United States or the Soviet Union. These particular clauses reveal the distrust of the
Egyptians.134 Despite the British proposal to create a new two-way alliance, Great Britain still
needed a mechanism to prevent Egypt from seeking actual independence. The British election of
1929 provided no such mechanism. Despite the British Liberal Party’s victory, which opposed
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Lord Lloyd’s heavy handed policies in Egypt, the Egyptian Liberal Party of Sarwat Pasha,
nonetheless rejected the British overtures as insufficient.135
Three very important international treaties shaped the United States policy at the close of
the decade. Separate treaties of arbitration and conciliation between the United States and Egypt
along with the International Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (also known as the
Kellogg- Briand Peace Pact) were among the major forces reshaping the international system.
This third treaty known for it outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy shared legacy
with the other lofty peace plans of Paris in 1919.136 For some in Egypt, however, the pact
offered possibility in the political struggle against the remaining hold Great Britain held on the
country as a result of the reservations of the February 28, 1922 unilateral declaration. In addition
to the maintenance of the Capitulations, Great Britain also reserved the right to keep a military
presence in Egypt. Some Egyptian political figures, including the Wafd, reasoned that if Egypt
signed the Kellogg- Briand treaty, the British reservation to complete independence concerning
military affairs would be nullified.137 In other words, if war was no longer a viable national
strategy, then Great Britain could no longer justify a military threat against Egypt and the Sudan.
Of course, this could have affect the progress of the agenda for national development outlined in
the 1924 Parliamentary assembly, as Mahmoud Passiouni (Vice President and President ad
interim of the Egyptian Senate) and the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies indicated
by attaching their names to separate, yet nearly identical political addresses.138
The United States accomplished a major interwar policy objective spanning several
administrations by creating a change in venue for international justice. The new venues provided
options for the United States to avoid institutions that had not developed in conjunction with the
rise in stature of the United States following World War I. The Treaty of Arbitration between
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the U.S. and Egypt advocated the new system of settling conflicts without using war as an
instrument of national policy. The Permanent Court of Arbitration established at the Hague by
the convention of October 18, 1907 was the preferred venue for settling disputes through
arbitration and not war.139 While “other competent tribunals” were an option, the League of
Nations was not an available venue. Shifting authority to the League would enhance Britain’s
strategy and weaken the national policy objectives of the United States. While, the appeal of
signing bilateral treaties enhanced Egyptian strategy, the focus of this treaty revealed that the
United States was not conducting altruistic foreign policy. The new system for justice would not
apply to American domestic issues or third parties and the Monroe Doctrine would reign
supreme over any attempt by a nation to use the treaties to infiltrate the American sphere of
influence. The American treaties sought to bypass the possibility of forfeiting sovereignty as the
Capitulations had done to Egypt.
The Treaty of Conciliation established the newly created permanent Internal Commission
for Arbitration as the new venue for disputes not solved by diplomacy or other competent
tribunals. An entirely different method of selecting judges was established, thereby eliminating
the problems that the United States had with the Mixed Courts. Egypt and the United States had
different motivations, but found common ground in this new judicial venue, namely challenging
the British vision for international relations. The arbitration commission had five members: one
from each country involved in the dispute, two judges from different countries selected by the
suing countries, and the final seat would be a mutually decided choice from a neutral nation.
The treaty established that “mutual agreement” was the cornerstone for most policies
surrounding the Commission. 140 This “mutual agreement” without the inclusion of Great Britain
satisfied both the United States’ and Egyptian development strategies during the 1920s.
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In the diplomatic correspondence that led to the agreements between the United States
and Egypt, one of the issues raised was the final ratification of Kellogg- Briand. The Secretary
of State Frank B. Kellogg informed his minister in Cairo Gunther: “There is no need to await
ratification by the Powers which signed the Treaty on August 27. The deposit of Acts of
Adherence with the government of the United States prior thereto will automatically make
adhering Powers party to the treaty at the instant the treaty becomes effective.”141 In the context
of the diplomatic episodes of the 1920s involving archaeology, taxes, and justice in which the
essence of the arguments can be reduced to the issue of “assurances,” it is significant that the acts
of deposit with the United States would reflect the legal basis of the new international system.
Much like the gold standard debate that fueled much tension between the United States and
Britain – paired with the insistence of the American and British museums that they deposit
archaeological finds in their home museums - possession seemed to indicate power. Possession
of treaties shaping the new world order put the United States in a strong position at the end of the
decade.142 Likewise, Egypt was empowered by the implementation of its own development
strategy. It is important to realize that Egypt’s small victory was another step and not a solution
to the autonomy issue.
The strategies of searching for new avenues to protect national interests in a changing
international system were evident in the international nature of the triangular microcosm of
British-Egyptian-American relations. While the Capitulations would exist until an agreement at
the Montreaux Convention of 1936 to end the practice of the extra-territorial rights in Egypt and
to eventually phase out the Mixed Courts in 1949, Egyptian strategies had found some success
regarding their political ability to reform their domestic and foreign affairs.143 This was a
realization of the goal of the 1924 Parliament. As the historical record indicates, Egypt had
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made significant strides between the years 1924-1930. Because of the leverage that Egypt
possessed in the international market for the prized commodity of Egyptian cotton Egypt not
only had the political will but also had seemingly developed the bargaining capacity to bring the
Powers to the negotiating table.144 In late 1929, Egypt sought to revise its Customs Regulations
(import and export duty schedules February 1931) by threatening at first the possibility of double
tariff rates for those countries not agreeing to most-favored-nation trading status with Egypt.
The Egyptians then threatened that those not willing to reach an accord would face double tariff
rates. Diplomatic extensions were available for those nations who demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate with Egypt. 145
The United States viewed the strategy of “increasing the revenues of the Egyptian
Treasury and at the same time placing on the Foreign Powers this burden of negotiating with it
Customs treaties” as “hasty, even if technically correct” in the legal sense.146 The United States
and Great Britain both eventually agreed, just before the February deadline, to the new tariffs
pending objections over the Capitulatory “rights.” What was missing from the diplomatic
correspondence was the usual discussion of how and which venue the Powers would pursue their
Capitulatory rights.147 This absence of venue coupled with the agreements under protest of
Britain and the United States indicated the effectiveness of the timing of the strategy to revise
import and export tariff levels. The United States’ only bargaining chip was to tie support of the
Egyptian proposal to the acceptance of unconditional most favored nation trade agreement as a
temporary fix, a mere eleven days before the new tariffs would take place.148 This would serve as
a stop gap measure until the treaty could be completed.149 However, the Egyptian Ministry of
Finance objected because in its opinion the only possible need for such an agreement was if the
United States planned to tax Egyptian exports into the United States at a higher rate than other
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countries.150 This implied that the American proposal sought a legal assurance while the
Egyptian Ministry replied that Egyptian customs regulations would be a reflection of how other
countries treated Egyptian products in their markets.
The attempt of Egypt to open economic ties with the Soviet Union in 1930 was part of
the debate over Egypt’s economic development plan and shaped the context in which the United
States and Great Britain made their decisions. One plan called for the disposal of internationally
desired Egyptian cotton in markets wherever possible and the other demanded industrial
development at home. The Egyptian Undersecretary of Finance Ahmed Hamdi Seif el Nasr Bey
supported the higher price (higher than the United States’ prices) for Egyptian cotton because he
believed it ensured quality, except when the local merchants removed the cotton from the
domestic market to get a higher guaranteed price from their government.151 These are issues that
both the United States and Great Britain faced in their status as ‘power’ nations in the context of
the early years of the world economic depression.152 These strategies revealed that Egypt was
placing its own domestic politics within the larger international situation in order to better Egypt.
The fluid nature of the international system that had been altered so much by the diplomacy of
the 1920s created the possibility for several intentions in the Egyptian reform strategy of 1924 to
be realized. Egypt began to strategically place itself in the new international system as opposed
to being controlled by anachronistic agreements that reflected 19th century imperialism.
Conclusion
Following World War I, Britain faced challenges to its international strategy from both
the United States and Egypt. Within the context of the more widely studied tensions between
Britain and the United States, the inclusion of the Egyptian strategy offers valuable insight that
leads to more complete understanding of 1920s diplomacy. In the tradition as Husayn al-
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Marsafi’s The Essay on Eight Words in 1881, several key concepts are important to this study.
Words such as reasonable, equitable, and moderate are incorporated into the strategies of the
United States and Britain to protect their national interests in Egypt as if it was a zero-sum game.
In instances when Egyptian political leaders demanded the application of these concepts to their
own agenda, the implications assumed different meanings and posed further obstacles for the
Egyptian goal of independence. The physical act of ‘depositing’ revealed a sense of power that
Foucault would realize and appreciate. Possession of mummified kings, treasure, new treaties,
and gold indicated power in the 1920s much as they had in earlier decades. Negotiations took
place throughout the decade concerning the legal validity and political viability of pursuing these
objects as ‘rights.’ The episodes revealed that at the core of every diplomatic drama was
insecurity with the existing system of assurances of good faith dealing, namely aside from
collusion for self-gain, a lack of trust existed. Perhaps the most revealing evidence for the
insecurity with the old world in the 1920s was the fact that at the end of the decade, political
maneuvers that matching the vision of the League of Nations and the Wilsonian Moment were
still being devised and implemented.
While Egyptian nationalism had used political, legal, and economic reform strategies
before and during the 1920s, the Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 attacked the root of their
problems, namely Capitulations. Internationalism in and of itself was not the answer to the
sovereignty crisis of Egypt. The Capitulations, the Mixed Courts, the various legal, political, and
economic reform strategies, and physical revolt against colonial occupation all were inherently
international and very problematic. The Egyptian political maneuvers at the end of the decade
had more potential than the previous reform strategies that failed. Egypt created leverage on
Great Britain by finding new avenues for their legal, economic, and political platforms through
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bilateral and multilateral treaties with the United States. While Nubar Pasha argued for the
creation of the Mixed Courts of Egypt in 1869 to remove the political dimensions of diplomacy
from the corrupt Capitulations system, Egyptian strategies of 1924-1930 used both bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic approaches to begin the process of excavating the relics of Ottoman,
British, and International tutelage from Egyptian soil. Events in Egypt in the 1920s demonstrate
that European ascendancy was beginning to ebb in the colonial arena.153 British hegemonic
influence in Egypt was waning due to the leverage that Egypt and the United States exerted on
the new system of international relations following World War I. These economic, political, and
legal battles fought in Egypt are the beginning of the British slow retreat from ‘East of Suez’,
which was completed in the 1960s.
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